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Bundled payments for hematopoietic cell transplantation (HCT) have long been accepted by both commercial
health insurance providers and transplant centers, effectively outpacing the use of this payment model else-
where in health care. As with the rest of health care, interest in payment and health delivery reform has created
demand for transplant providers to address value by incorporating quality metrics and strategic changes in
network design The complexity of evaluating performance in HCT complicates the goal of rewarding providers
for better performance and penalizing poor results. We provide an introduction to value-based purchasing and
address potential considerations in the adoption of incentives to improve quality of care in HCT.
 2015 American Society for Blood and Marrow Transplantation.INTRODUCTION
Bundled payments, pay-for-performance, and value-
based purchasing are examples of terms that broadly
describe various arrangements that provide ﬁnancial in-
centives to health providers for improving the overall beneﬁt
per expenditure on healthcare services. Such programs are
not new, with documentation of examples of clearly deﬁned
performance-based incentives in health care found as early
as 1750 B.C. in a set of laws from ancient Mesopotamia [1].
More recently, momentum has been gathering since the
Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS; Medicare)
began to pay hospitals for publicly reporting their perfor-
mance on a limited number of indicators in 2004 [2]. The
2010 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act included a
number of provisions designed to improve quality of care,
including the Medicare hospital value-based purchasing
program, the Medicare physician value-based payment
modiﬁer, the Bundled Payments for Care Improvement
demonstrations, and the Accountable Care Organization
shared savings programs and demonstrations (ACA). In
January 2015, US Department of Health and Human Services
Secretary Burwell announced the administration’s goal
of tying 50% of all payments for traditional Medicaredgments on page 1371.
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ty for Blood and Marrow Transplantation.beneﬁciaries to these structures by 2018 [3]. A parallel and
increasing focus on these payment models and networking
strategies in the commercial healthcare purchasing sector
has created an urgency for all types of providers to under-
stand and participate in this new reimbursement environ-
ment (Table 1). This article outlines how bundled payments,
pay-for-performance, and value-based purchasing have and
will be used within the ﬁeld of hematopoietic cell trans-
plantation (HCT).
BUNDLED PAYMENTS
Early Model: Medicare Diagnosis-related Groups
For some time, policymakers and healthcare purchasers
at all levels have been concerned about the unsustainable
trajectory of healthcare costs. Until relatively recently, much
of healthcare reimbursement in the United States remained
on a fee-for-service or “percent of charges” basis, with little
to no adjustment based on patient health status or outcomes
after the service was complete. This payment model incen-
tivized physicians and hospitals to focus on volume as the
key mechanism for ﬁnancial performance or growth. Medi-
care felt this acutely, because the traditional beneﬁciary
populations are frequent users of care: Payments for medical
expenses average $500 billion per year (14.4% of the US
federal budget) [4].
To attempt to counteract the incentives of fee for service,
CMS began using diagnosis related groups (DRGs) in the
inpatient hospital setting in 1983 to create a prospective
payment system [5]. DRGs are “prospective payment” in that
Table 1
Payment Models
Model Structure Level of
Risk to
Providers
Fee for service Separate payment is made to
healthcare provider for each service.
Low
Inpatient DRG Prospective payment system that assigns
relative value to an inpatient hospital
episode of care. Level of reimbursement
is based on resource intensity of hospital
admission.
Bundled
episode
A single predetermined payment to cover
all goods and services delivered by
healthcare providers for a deﬁned episode
of care.
Moderate
Disease-speciﬁc
capitation
Payment system based on a payment for
each person in a population receiving
speciﬁc services. Nonspeciﬁed services are
reimbursed as fee for services.
Accountable care
organization
A set of providers that work
collaboratively and accept collective
accountability for cost and quality of care
delivered to a population. Payment may
include fee-for-service, episode, and
partial or full capitation.
High
Global capitation Payment system based on a payment for
each enrolled person rather than a
payment per service. Global capitation
covers all services such as professional,
facility, pharmaceutical, lab, etc.
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based on a relative value weighting system, and are not
dependent on the charges billed by the provider for that
individual transaction. Only 1 DRG is paid per inpatient visit,
and the DRG is assigned based on various codes and data that
appear on the billed claim submitted by a provider, such as
International Classiﬁcation of Diseases, or ICD, diagnosis and
procedure codes, age, sex, and discharge status.
DRGs vary in reimbursement for the type of clinical epi-
sodes they reﬂect but remain a bundled payment for the set
of smaller services encompassed by the inpatient visit. In
some cases, DRG payments are adjusted further for patient
complexity or for a hospital’s status as an academic health
center or Disproportionate Share provider. Medicare fol-
lowed the Inpatient Prospective Payment System with
similar structures and methodology (ie, bundling of Current
Procedural Terminology codes) in other environments and
continues tomove toward episodic preset payment amounts.Bundled Payments for HCT: Commercial “Case Rates”
Contracting with commercial health insurance providers
for HCT has effectively outpaced the experience elsewhere in
health care and is structured similarly to Medicare DRGs,
albeit more expansive in time and scope. Since the mid-
1990s, many, if not most, patients receive their care under
contracts with prenegotiated rates bundled to include inpa-
tient, postcare, and, often, precare. This “case-rate” approach
hinges on the ability of providers at a center to assume re-
sponsibility for a greater percentage of the total cost of care
delivered for the episode deﬁned in the contract (Table 2).
Case rates also potentially allow physicians more control
over the treatment plan and location of care, thus enhancing
value to the purchaser and efﬁciencies to the provider.
Case rates are complicated structures that need frequent
review and modiﬁcation by both parties because of changes
in practice and technology but have been largely accepted forclose to 20 years. Although a full discussion of contracting for
HCT is beyond the scope of this article, considerations of
certain contractual elements such as time frame, carve-outs
for expensive drugs, coverage of donor evaluation, cell
acquisition, and stop-loss thresholds may have direct or in-
direct impact on patient care decisions. HCT is an expensive
therapy, and case rates have helped create predictable ex-
penditures attached to catastrophic diagnoses in the lives
of commercially covered members. However, as discussed
later, further enhancing value by incorporating pay-for-
performance metrics and strategic network design is
becoming increasingly in demand by healthcare purchasers.
PAY-FOR-PERFORMANCE MEASURES
Pay-for-performance programs use ﬁnancial incentives
(or disincentives) to motivate quality improvement or
maintenance. These programs typically reward providers
with bonuses when high marks are achieved on selected
quality measures shown to lead to better outcomes.
Although such rewards may cause providers to prioritize
incented quality measures, care must be applied to ensure
this does not occur at the expense of unrewarded behaviors
leading to an overall decline in patient care. The direct link-
age of reward to performance differentiates pay for perfor-
mance from public reporting of outcomes that, in theory,
motivates through consumer response.
Elements common to all payment-based incentives are
(1) deﬁned targets to be evaluated, (2) measures and per-
formance standards for establishing the target criteria, and
(3) ﬁnancial incentives [1]. One of the attractive features of
pay-for-performance models is the capacity to compliment
almost any payment arrangement. Most arrangements for
pay for performance address quality-based measures but
could also target costs of care, quantity of services delivered,
or patient satisfaction [1,6].
Four types of measures used in pay for performance are
clinical outcomes, process measures, structural measures,
and patient satisfaction (Table 3). The National Quality
Strategy, which created national aims and priorities to guide
quality improvement efforts, can provide the framework for
the development of quality measures [1,7,8]. The three aims
of better care, better health, and lower cost coincide with the
structures of new delivery and payment models.
Certain characteristics should be considered in selection
of effective metrics chosen for performance measures. For
obvious reasons, the metric should be associated with
meaningful improvement in quality or efﬁciency so it is
linked with improved value of care. The metric must also be
reliably measurable and clearly linked to desired outcome. In
measuring the metric, adequate risk adjustment for patient
differences is critical to fairly compare performance and
avoid unintended consequences, such as avoidance of high-
risk patients [7]. The ability to continue to accept appro-
priate patients who may beneﬁt from HCT is of particular
concern because of the potential for cure, even in high-risk
populations. Finally, the metric should be actionable and
clearly linked to the desired outcomes such that addressing
the indicator leads to enhanced value.
VALUE-BASED PURCHASING
Value-based purchasing is, in theory, the marriage of
bundled payment and pay for performance, as operational-
ized through payer networks and contracting mechanisms.
Because neither fee-for-service nor DRG-based reimburse-
ment models provide strong inherent incentives to control
Table 2
Overview of HCT Case-Rate Contracting Structure
Period of Care Description Begins Ends
Pretransplant period
Time period before the transplant period begins The date patient is accepted by
program as a transplant candidate
Day before the ﬁrst day of the transplant period
Components
 Transplant consult; HLA typing of related and unrelated donors and/or umbilical cord blood unit(s)
 Evaluation of disease status (eg, bone marrow biopsy, computed tomography, serum protein electrophoresis)
 Evaluation of organ function (eg, liver function tests, echocardiogram, pulmonary function tests)
 Psychosocial assessment
 Other evaluations to determine recipient suitability (eg, consultation with a specialist, additional tests to evaluate abnormal ﬁndings)
 Assessments to determine related or unrelated donor suitability and eligibility
Transplant period
Time period during which the transplant procedure
and routine follow-up care are provided
HC allogeneic inpatient/outpatient First day of preparative therapy 100 days after the ﬁrst day of HC infusion
HC autologous inpatient/outpatient First day of preparative therapy 30 days after the ﬁrst day of HC infusion
Tandem transplants First day of preparative therapy for
each transplant
Time period as deﬁned above for each transplant
episode of the tandem transplant
Components
 Mobilization and collection of peripheral blood or bone marrow HCs
 Conditioning regimen chemotherapy and/or radiation therapy
 Hospitalization and/or outpatient visits associated with administration of conditioning regimen
 Infusion of bone marrow, peripheral blood, or umbilical cord blood HCs
 Hospitalization and/or outpatient post-transplant supportive care
 Management of HCT related complications
Post-transplant period
Time period after the transplant period ends Day after the transplant period ends For autologous HC, 60 days after ﬁrst HC infusion;
for allogeneic HC, 1 year after the ﬁrst HC infusion
Components
 Hospitalization or outpatient supportive care
 Management of HCT related complications
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arrangements to reduce unnecessary care through capitation
to cover a given set of services. Efforts to enhance the value
of health care solely by controlling costs have been con-
strained by concerns about the impact on quality and access
to providers [9].
Value-based purchasing is a strategy to reward providers
with superior outcomes and efﬁciency with enhanced pay-
ments through differential reimbursements and increased
market share via purchaser, payer, and/or consumer selec-
tion. Payers typically require that the transplant facility meet
deﬁned criteria for acceptance into a “center of excellence”
(COE) network. The requirements usually include certain
facility accreditations such as The Joint Commission and the
Foundation for the Accreditation of Cellular Therapy (FACT),
as well as measures of transplant program infrastructure,
volume, and outcomes. Eligibility in the Blue Cross Blue
Shield Blue Distinction þ network is also based on how
“efﬁciently” care is delivered, as determined by the center’s
ability to meet certain cost criteria [10]. Patients seeking to
have their transplant performed in a program that is not
qualiﬁed in a given payer COE network may ﬁnd they have
substantial copays or even no beneﬁts at that facility. For
many centers, gaining qualiﬁcation to participate in a payer
network is, in effect, pay for performance. Payers can clearly
and easily direct patients away from a center that is out of
network based on ﬁnancial incentives for the patient. The
heightened interest on the part of payers and purchasers to
develop narrow networks, with the goal of decreasing cost
variation and directing patients to centers with increased
expertise, is increasingly a concern for both providers and
patients, who can often face fewer choices in their home
geographic area.
Shared savings programs have attracted interest as a way
of enhancing value, especially for programs that alreadydeliver good outcomes. In the model, the provider is rewar-
ded with a portion of savings realized from reduction of
healthcare spending. The major potential problem with this
approach is that providers may assume risk without re-
sources or incentives. A second ﬂaw is that shared savings
rewards high spenders rather than high performers. Those
providers who already have low costs and high quality of
care can in effect be penalized. Finally, the approach may not
sustainable once the initial savings have been achieved.
Models of value-based purchasing have most commonly
used pay for performance to address quality and efﬁciency by
tying a reserve bonus payment to the achievement of pre-
viously determined levels of metric-based quality care. There
is less general experience with other models such as pay-
ment for episodes of treatment, accountable care organiza-
tions, or provider-side capitation.
INCENTIVES AND ACCOUNTABILITY
Incentives may be tied to an absolute threshold or relative
to the performance of all providers and structured to reward
all who meet a threshold, top performers, or those with the
greatest improvement. The advantage of tying rewards to
achievement of an absolute threshold (eg, the percentage of
HCT patients being vaccinated according to established
guidelines) [1,11] is there is no uncertainty about whether a
standard is met. However, all providers may not be equally
incented to improve, because those who are well above the
threshold may not be motivated to achieve further
improvement and those far below the threshold may also be
unmotivated because they believe their efforts will be fruit-
less. Relative standards focus on the ranking of each provider
to their peers and have the advantage of being able to
recognize improvement (eg, from the third to second
quartile). Here again, high achievers may have little oppor-
tunity to improve, potentially limiting reward. The relative
Table 3
Types of Measures Used in Pay for Performance
Clinical outcomes
The preferred standard but only selectively used because they are
easily confounded by elements beyond the provider’s treatment,
such as social factors (eg, compliance or access to care) or clinical
factors (eg, clinical risk or behavior of referring physicians or other
providers). The center-speciﬁc outcomes report by the CIBMTR
accounts for many of these factors, but the complexities of risk
adjustment to accurately predict future center performance can
limit the utility for an individual patient or purchaser in the
evaluation of the individual provider [20]. Clinical outcomes are
likely the most important measure category to HCT patients.
Process measures
Addresses the proper delivery of healthcare services and are often
easier to collect than outcome measures. Such measures tend to
focus on discrete events in a single setting of care rather than
looking across an entire episode of care [7]. Inspection and
accreditation by FACT historically addressed process measures by
validating the structures and practices of a center. Compliance
with process measures does not always ensure good outcomes,
however, and the linkage between variations in practice and
outcomes remains a subject of investigation [21,22].
Structural measures
Includes experience and level of personnel, stafﬁng, facilities, and
equipment. Structural measures have long been used by payers in
contracting for HCT COEs and are a component of the American
Society for Blood and Marrow Transplant Request For Information
used by many payers in center evaluation. A recent survey
provided the ﬁrst data benchmarking program structure of HCT
facilities in North America and preliminary correlations with
outcomes [23]. Because of the wide variation in program structure
and absence of information about process measures in the
programs evaluated, this information requires further
investigation before we can be conﬁdent about extrapolating
observations across institutions.
Patient satisfaction
Measures have the advantage of being relatively easy to obtain and
can be used to improve communication between patients and
providers. The linkage between patient satisfaction and quality,
however, is not well established [24]. It will be important to study
both patient satisfaction measures with the process and
experience with transplant and their long-term satisfaction with
their choice to pursue HCT.
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may have little practical signiﬁcance. Because of the com-
plexities of risk adjusting metrics in HCT, it is less likely that
relative standards could be applied in the near term.
Nevertheless, the possibility of payers driving to narrow
networks as they are in other areas of medicine may foster
the development of metrics that facilitate ranking of HCT
centers.
Deﬁning who is to be rewarded is fundamental to a suc-
cessful performance plan. The program should reward the
provider responsible for making changes to the standard
being evaluated. Accountability for performance without
responsibility has the potential to discourage motivation to
achieve the goal. Even with clearly deﬁned accountability
and responsibility, attribution of improvement may not be
straightforward. Healthcare interventions leading to
improvement require analysis of multiple factors, are often
collaborative, and may not be attributable to a single indi-
vidual. For example, improvement in the time to ﬁrst anti-
biotic for outpatients with neutropenic fever is clearly a goal
that is meaningful, measurable, and actionable but not
widely met [12]. Improving the process to achieve the goal
requires engagement and agreement across several de-
partments in a hospital as well as multiple specialties and
disciplines. Determining the marginal contribution of each
team member may therefore be difﬁcult.Although the effect of ﬁnancial incentives on the behavior
of individuals is well studied, how ﬁnancial incentives
change the behavior of complex organizations is less
understood [2,13]. To achieve meaningful improvements in
HCT potentially requires agreement and coordination across
a continuum of providers, including multiple physician
specialties, hospitals, outpatient clinics, pharmacy, and home
care. Improvements in care may require investments or in-
crease near-term costs that are not equally distributed across
the continuum. This may impede the development of aligned
incentives, especially if rewards are not distributed propor-
tionate to investment. For example, performing a larger
number of HCT as outpatients may require modiﬁcations to
outpatient facilities and more personnel but may also in-
crease demands on providers, especially after hours. Aligning
incentives among the facility and providers is central to the
development of a successful program.
If one considers the continuum of care of a patient un-
dergoing HCT, it may be that the most effective way to
improve outcomes and reduce cost for patients undergoing
HCT would be to develop a program with referring physi-
cians that encourages timely referral of candidate for HCT.
Patients that have advanced disease and comorbidities
resulting from prolonged therapy clearly have more difﬁcult
and more expensive transplant episodes than those patients
treated earlier and in better condition.
DOES IT WORK?
The rationale that money changes behavior is compelling
and likely explains why value-based purchasing was
embraced by the Affordable Care Act despite little evidence
linking such programs to improvements in quality of care
[2,3]. One of the ﬁrst studies examining this question was a
report on the initial results of a 3-year program in which
more than 200 hospitals agreed to participate in quality
benchmarking databases maintained by Premier, with pay-
ments allocated on the basis of quality performance. Hospi-
tals performing in the top decile received a 2% increase in
Medicare payments, those in the second decile received 1%,
and hospitals landing in the lowest 2 deciles were liable for a
1% to 2% penalty in the third year. Lindenauer et al. [14]
matched these hospitals with 406 hospitals that were
providing CMS with a subgroup of the same quality-
performance data intended for public reporting but not
participating in the incentive compensation program. Both
groups improved after adjustment for cofounders, but the
incremental improvement of the incented hospitals was only
2.9%. Even this improvement was short-lived because there
was no signiﬁcant difference in performance scores after the
ﬁfth year of the demonstration project [14]. A similar Hos-
pital Quality Incentive Demonstration was introduced in all
hospitals in northwest England in 2008 with initial
improvement in mortality among the conditions measured
compared with control hospitals [15]. However, by the end of
the 42-month follow-up, the reduced mortality in partici-
pating hospitals was no longer signiﬁcant because mortality
fell in the control hospitals more than in the participating
hospitals.
Although these and several other studies have failed to
replicate the early success of pay for performance, they do
not disprove the potential of such programs to improve
quality for several reasons [16]. Each was performed in a
different economic environment, offered different levels of
ﬁnancial incentives, and used different performance mea-
surements [2]. In addition, while the Premier study was
Table 4
Possible Measures for Pay for Performance
Meaningful Measurable Actionable
1-yr overall survival þ þ þ
FACT þ þ þ
100-day overall survival þ  þ
Readmission þ  
Hospital acquired conditions þ  þ
cGVHD þ  
Patient-reported outcomes þ  þ
Marrow vs. peripheral blood þ þ þ
Antibiotic pathway for
neutropenic patients
þ þ þ
Survivorship measures þ þ 
Data management þ þ þ
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rolled out its Hospital Compare website. Hospitals began to
attempt to close the quality gap because of public reporting
in anticipation that CMS would implement pay for perfor-
mance across all hospitals [3]. Similar spillover effects were
identiﬁed in the English study. In both the Premier and En-
glish studies, incentives changed over the course of the
study, further confounding analysis of impact.
MOVING FORWARD: ENHANCING VALUE FOR HCT
A few validated measures in HCT meet the National
Quality Strategy criteria. The Center of International Blood
and Marrow Transplant Research’s (CIBMTR) Stem Cell Out-
comes Database reported 1-year overall survival does allow a
facility to compare its patients with a similar group of
reported patients, providing assurance that the center is
meeting risk-adjusted outcomes. Their risk-adjusted out-
comes data do not allow ranking of centers by outcome.
FACT/Joint Accreditation Committee ISCT and EBMT (JACIE)
accreditation ensures compliance with processes that are
viewed as best practice, and a report from JACIE links
accreditation with improved outcomes [17]. Another report,
however, suggests this beneﬁcial effect may plateau if pro-
cesses are the sole measure of quality [18]. The inability to
use either Stem Cell Outcomes Database reported outcomes
or FACT/JACIE accreditation to measure incremental
improvement or ranking of programs further limits these as
measures for performance rewards.
Even large-volume transplant centers are unlikely to
transplant enough patients from a single payer to meaning-
fully evaluate performance on a given clinical measure.
Table 4 displays some possible outcome measures that have
potential application to HCT. Most of these lack either uni-
form reporting standards or validated processes for risk
adjustment. Others may not be actionable. An example of a
metric that is both difﬁcult to measure and inﬂuence is
incidence of chronic graft-versus-host disease (cGVHD).
Consensus on how to clinically score cGVHD is evolving, and
there is little or no information about how to risk-adjust
outcomes across centers. Because HCT case rates often end
at 100 days for allogeneic HCT, centersmay not be in network
once patients revert back to primary insurance, thus limiting
patient access to transplant centers for long-term care. For
this reason, prevention and management of cGVHD may not
be a measure that is actionable for the center.
Although the list of measures in Table 4 may not be
comprehensive, 3 are worthy of consideration as perfor-
mance measures. The ﬁrst is a set of recommendations for
screening and prevention for long-term survivors of HCT
[11]. These measures are similar to those used for wellness inother populations and are relatively easy to score. As with
cGVHD, however, HCT centers may not be in the patient’s
insurance network after the transplant episode so that
scoring would have to be adjusted for those patients who
could be seen at the center. A second measure is the pref-
erential use of bone marrow over peripheral blood as a cell
source for HCT in patients with nonmalignant conditions or
low risk of relapse [19]. Although overall outcomes are
similar between the 2 cell sources for patients undergoing
unrelated HCT, the use of peripheral blood is associated with
a signiﬁcantly higher rate of cGHVD and requirement for
long-term immunosuppression. A third measure that could
be considered for performance incentives is reporting of
autologous HCT patients to the CIBMTR. The reporting of
allogeneic but not autologous patient data is required by the
Stem Cell Outcomes Database so the assessment of a center’s
risk-adjusted outcomes does not consider all patients treated
at the center. The CIBMTR periodically audits data collection
and reporting and provides HPC programs with critical error
scores and random error scores. HCT programs that have
error rates of 3% or more are required by the CIBMTR to
present a corrective action plan. Two important concerns to
address are that many centers lack sufﬁcient stafﬁng for data
management and the CIBMTR is not presently funded to
perform outcome analysis.
CONCLUSION
Pay-for-performance initiatives are moving into broader
use but may not make sense for HCT centers and payers in
their current form. The case-rate contracting strategy for
inclusion in payer COE is, in effect, already pay for perfor-
mance. Public reporting of outcomes for allogeneic trans-
plant ensures patients and payers that a center is meeting
predicted outcomes. FACT accreditation ensures the center is
compliant with standards updated by an international panel
of experts every 3 years. To be effective, goals for perfor-
mance programs need to be clearly deﬁned. Metrics selected
to measure achievement must be meaningful and measur-
able and ones the center can inﬂuence. Those that leverage
the CIBMTR database are preferable because all centers are
required to report allogeneic patients, and reporting autol-
ogous patients will be required in the 6th edition of the FACT
standards and the data are routinely audited. Finally, in-
centives need to be aligned with the responsible parties.
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